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TOXIC GAS ENTERED CABIN DURING EARTH LANDING SEQUENCE
STATEMENT
Toxic gas entered the cabin during repressurization for 30 seconds
from manual deployment of the drogue parachutes at 18 550 feet (5650 m)
to disabling of the reaction control system at 9600 feet (2925 m).
EARTH LANDING SEQUENCE
Nominal Sequence
Nominal operation of the Apollo earth landing sequence for the Apollo
Soyuz Test Project was for the crew to arm the sequencer pyrotechnic buses
at 50 000 feet (15 240 m) altitude. At 30 000 feet (9145 m), the crew was
to arm the automatic earth landing system (ELS) sequencer by positioning
the two ELS switches to LOGIC and AUTO. As shown in figure i, arming the
earth landing system applies sense power to the 24 O00-foot (7315-m) baro-
switches. When the 24 O00-foot baroswitches close, the sense power latches
the ELS activate relay. This applies power to the reaction control system
(RCS) disable relay and the 0.4-, 2.0-, and 14.0-second timers for the
apex cover (forward heat shield), drogue parachutes, and main parachutes,
respectively. Timeout of the 14-second timer applies power to the i0 O00-
foot (3050-m) baroswltches. Closure of the i0 O00-foot baroswitches re-
leases the drogue parachutes and deploys the main parachutes. Manual
switches must be used to disable the reaction control system and deploy
the parachutes if the redundant automatic system fails.
Actual Sequence
The crew was about 20 seconds late in arming the pyrotechnic buses,
arming them at 37 000 feet (11 280 m) during the time-critical earth land-
ing sequence. The right-seat crewman talked about the two ELS switches
that arm the automatic earth landing sequencer at 30 000 feet (9145 m).
The left-seat crewman did not acknowledge and the two switches were not
thrown until 55 seconds later when the center-seat crewman called them
out (fig. 2). Realizing that the drogue parachutes had not deployed auto-
matically, the left-seat crewman switched to cue card backup procedures,
manually Jettisoning the forward heat shield and manually deploying the
drogue parachutes. However, the reaction control system was not disabled
manually (a backup function) by placing the RCS CMD switch in the OFF
position. The nominal and actual earth landing trajectories and sequences
are compared in figure 3.
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Spacecraft control had not been returned to the stabilization and con-
trol system mlnlmum-lmpulse mode at 90 000 feet (27 430 m). (In this con-
trol mode, the reaction control system responds only to manual commands.)
Therefore, the spacecraft motions induced by the deployment of the drogue
parachutes caused the guidanc= and control system to attempt to stabilize
the spacecraft by issuing commands to the reaction control system thrusters.
The thruster activity was vigorous and lasted for 30 seconds, being termi-
nated when the left-seat crewman finally armed the automatic earth landing
sequencer by throwing the ELS switches to LOGIC and AUTO. This action
operated the RCS disable relay.
Oxidizer Boiloff
During the 30-second period of high thruster activity, combustion
products of monomethyl hydrazine (fuel) and nitrogen tetroxlde (oxidizer)
were expelled from the thrusters for a period of 7 seconds. These prod-
ucts consist primarily of water with nitrogen oxides and some salts.
Then, the CM RCS PRPLNT switches were positioned to OFF by the center-
seat crewman at an altitude of about 16 000 feet (4880 m), causing the pro-
pellant isolation valves to close. These switches were turned off at ap-
proximately the nominal time, as shown in figure 2. Closure of the propel-
lant isolation valves allowed the oxidizer trapped between the valves and
the thrusters to boll off (fig. 4) as the thrusters operated for 23 addi-
tional seconds before the reaction control system was inhibited by the op-
eration of the RCS disable relay at an altitude of about 9600 feet (2925 m). !t
The oxidizer boils at pressures below about 15 psia (10.3 N/cm 2) while
the fuel boils at pressures below about i psia (0.7 N/cm2). Thus, the ox-
idizer trapped between the propellant isolation valves and the solenoid
valves boiled at the altitudes through which the connnand module was de-
scending during the 23-second period between closure of the propellant iso-
lation valves and operation of the RCS disable relay. One of the positive
roll thrusters was 2 feet (0.6 m) away from the steam vent through which
outside air was pulled into the command module after opening of the cabin
pressure relief valve (fig. 5). This thruster fired in the direction of
the vent and was open for 19 of the 23 seconds. During this time, i.i
pounds (0.5 kg) of oxidizer was expelled from this thruster. The negative
roll engines did not fire during the 23-second period. Each pitch and yaw
thruster fired for about ii of the 23 seconds. Of the total of 9 pounds
(4.1 kg) of oxidizer that was trapped in the lines of both reaction con-
trol systems, 7.4 pounds (3.4 kg) boiled off during the 23 seconds of high
thruster activity.
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Toxic Gas in Cabin
The cabin pressure relief valve opened automatically at about 24 500
feet (7470 m) to allow the cabin pressure to equalize with the ambient at-
mospheric pressure during descent. Thus, during the 30-second period of
high thruster activity after drogue parachute deployment, a mixture of air
and propellant combustion products followed by a mixture of air and nitro-
gen tetroxlde vapors were sucked into the cabin. Figure 5 shows the flow
field and mixing around the coummnd module. The crewmen were exposed to
the oxidizer vapors for 4 minutes and 40 seconds, from closure of the re-
action control: system isolation valves until they were able to don emer-
gency oxygen masks after landing. (The masks were not accessible during
descent.)
OXIDIZER CONCENTRATION ANALYSIS
Aerodynamic Analysis
Based on a theory of a periodic shedding of the vortices in the com-
mand module wake, it was determined that the gas mixture outside the vent
inlet to the cabin would have ranged from 3307 to 4868 mg/m 3 of oxidizer
from 16 000 feet (4880 m) to 9600 feet (2925 m). Details of the analysis
are presented in the appendix. The principal product of nitrogen tetrox-
ide and air is nitrogen dioxide. With moisture or water, nitric acid is
formed. Because of its relative prevalence, stability, and toxicity, ni-
trogen dioxide is the primary concern for crew exposure. The average of
4100 mg/m 3 of oxidizer is equivalent to 2000 parts of nitrogen dioxide per
million parts of air by volume at 1 atmosphere (10.1 N/r 2).
Environmental Control Analysis
The cabin pressure relief valve allows air to enter the cabin in the
left-slde lower equipment bay behind a panel 2 feet (0.6 m) from the inlet
- to the suit loop. As shown in figure 6, the suit loop inlet recirculates
cabin air during entry when the crew is unsuited. Cabin total pressure
changed from 6.3 to 14.4 psia (4.3 to 9.9 N/cm 2) during the 3 minute and
40 second period from the time the reaction control system isolation
valves closed until landing. The suit loop was functioning for 3 minutes
and 14 seconds of this time until it was turned off at 800 feet (245 m)
altitude prior to landing. Total crew exposure to the toxic oxidizer
vapors was for the 4 minutes and 40 seconds from closure of the reaction
control system isolation valves until donning of the oxygen masks. The
effective free cabin volume for true contaminant diffusion was estimated
to be 65 percent of the pressurizable volume, or 207 cubic feet (5.9 m3).
- 3
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Fifty percent of the suit loop flow is through the lithium hydroxide
canisters. The remainder flows through a hole in the middle of each can-
ister. All the suit loop flow passes through the glycol heat exchanger
where the toxic gases not removed by the lithium hydroxide canisters would
be converted to nitric acid after reacting with water.
Postfllght analysis of the lithium hydroxide canisters showed a thin
yellow layer on top with a high nitrogen dioxide content. This layer was
less than i percent by weight. The next 20 percent had a gray color with
a nitrogen dioxide concentration half that of the top layer. The bottom
80 percent was not discolored and had a negligible nitrogen dioxide con-
tent.
The lithium hydroxide canisters collected only about 0.5 gram of
nitrogen dioxide from a total of 12 grams that was calculated to have en-
tered the cabin. Thus, the suit loop was not the primary mechanism for
removal of the oxidizer from the cabin atmosphere.
Color Analysis
Nitrogen tetroxide or nitrogen dioxide is colorless but its interme-
diate state is nitrogen trioxide which is reddish brown. As the concen-
tration of nitrogen trioxide increases, the color cLanges from yellow to
brown to a brownish-red. Nitrogen tetroxide and air mixtures in 2-inch
(5.l-cm) diameter tubes at i atmosphere (i0.i N/cm 2) are shown in fig- I
ure 7. Nitrogen tetroxide reacts in air to form a variety of nitrogen
oxides, the principal one being nitrogen dioxide.
The Apollo Conunander stated that his first visual observation was a
dark reddlsh-brown cloud very suddenly occupying his entire field of view
lastlng, perhaps, 20 to 30 seconds. The cloud consisted of clearly dis-
cernlble suspended particles or droplets. The initial color was closest
to that of tube 5 in the figure. Subsequently, there was only a slight
haze having a color between those of tubes 2 and 3. The odor and irri-
tants remained and exposure continued until about 1 minute after landing
when the oxygen masks were unstowed for each of the crew. The eye-to-
panel distance in the spacecraft was estimated by the crew to be about
20 inches (51 cm). Equivalent spacecraft concentrations would be about
1/10th the parts per million shown.
Estimate of Average Crew Exposure
The estimated cabin oxidizer concentration is shown in figure 8.
The maximum concentration of toxic gas in the cabin should have been re-
duced from about i000 to 700 parts per milllon of nitrogen dioxide at 1
atmosphere because part of the gas entering the cabin flowed through the
4
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suit circuit. The rapid decay shown in the figure assumes reaction of
nitrogen dioxide with moisture in the cabin to obtain an average concen-
tration consistent with the lithium hydroxide canister analysis. This
results in an estimated average crew exposure of about 250 Farts per mil-
llon of nitrogen dioxide over a period of 4 minutes and 40 seconds.
The formation of droplets of the toxic gas, as observed by the Apollo
Commander, may have increased the initial maximum local concentration.
. However, the limited amount of oxidizer avallable downstream of the iso-
lation valves and the high probability of the droplets reacting with mois-
ture on the aamp cabin surfaces would tend to decrease the long-term con-
centration.
Table I (from ref. i) presents the effects of nitrogen dioxide on
man. The most important factors and conditions that can modify and slg-
nificantly alter human response to nitrogen dioxide are temperature, pre-
disposing disease, heredity, age, and interactions with other pollutants.
The estimated average exposure of about 250 parts per million at 1 atmos-
phere is compatible with the data in table I. The medical findings support
the evidence that the crew was exposed to a high level of oxidizer prod-
ucts and that there were no other toxic compounds such as monomethyl hy-
drazlne. Further information on medical results is presented in reference
2.
POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO CREW EXPOSURE
Crew Procedures
Time-critical manual switching.- Time-critical manual switching had
been required on early Apollo flights to protect against slngle-point
failures. After redesign, the sequencer pyrotechnic buses were armed
prior to entry on Apollo 15 and subsequent flights. However, crew proce-
dures for this mission went back to the pre-Apollo 15 procedure of arming
the sequencer pyrotechnic buses at 50 000 feet (15 240 m) during time-
critical landing operations. Manual backup capability was used to inhibit
a crew-safety automatic sequence during a time-critlcal operation. As a
result, three crucial manual functions were required within the few sec-
onds before reaching 24 000 feet (7315 m) for the automatic sequencer to
operate as designed.
Cue card and checklist conflict.- RCS CMD-OFF was listed on the panel
1 (left-seat) entry cue card as a normal function rather than being flagged
with asterisks denoting a backup functJon as on the checklist (fig. 9).
In training, the RCS CMD switch was never turned off unless the center
seat crewman turned it off when manual backup procedures were used. If
5
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there was loss of intercommunications due to noise or when backup manual
procedures were required, the left-seat crewman used the panel i entry
cue card. The cue card and checklist conflict about RCS CMD-OFF may have
contributed to the reaction control system not being manually disabled
when the left-seat crewman switched to cue card backup procedures.
Differences between training and real-time procedures.- During crew
training, the center-seat crewman read the entry checklist and the left-
seat crewman repeated the tasks as he accomplished them. The right-seat
crewman was not trained to read procedures during entry. The landing cue
card on panel 3 was not adequate to do the Job because it was simplified
6 months prior to launch, deleting most manual backup tasks including
RCS CMD-OFF (fig. i0). During the time-critical earth landing sequence,
the right-seat crewman talked about "ELS, LOGIC, AUTO" at 30 000 feet
(9145 m). The next mention of these switches was by the center-seat
crewman 55 seconds later at i0 000 feet (3050 m). The capability for the
right-seat crewman to take over or assist the real-time callout of entry
procedures was restricted by the major change to the panel 3 landing cue
card deleting RCS CMD-OFF and other backup manual tasks.
Communications
Entry intercommunication procedures for each headset provide individ-
ual volume controls for intercommunication, VRF, and S-band, as well as
a master volume control. Intercommunication and VHF are amplified for
the onboard cecorder, bypassing the individual headset volume controls
(fig. ii). S-band, as well as any unplanned noises at or above normal
listening levels, is also recorded on the onboard recorder due to cross-
talk coupling between the headset and the microphone modules.
The crew reported trouble communicating due to noise starting at
about 50 000 feet (15 240 m). The onboard tapes revealed an intermittent
warbling tone received on the S-band for about 8 to 10 seconds at 90 000
feet (27 430 m). From this time until landlng, there was no apparent
problem with intercommunications and crew conversation recorded by the on-
board recorder was clear with the reaction control system thrusters firing
in the background. As on previous missions, high cabin vent noise was
present between 24 000 feet (7315 m) and 5000 feet (1525 m).
Emergency Oxygen Masks
Crew exposure to the toxic oxidizer vapors _y have been minimized
had the emergency oxygen masks been accessible to the crewmen while they
were restrained in the seats during entry and landing. The emergency
oxygen masks were designed for use as a backup to the suit circuit during
unsuited operations in case of smoke or contamination in the cabin, but
the stowage location prevented their use during descent.
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CONCLUSIONS
Four switches were missed by the crew:
First - Spacecraft control was not returned to the proper mode at 90 000
feet (27 430 m).
Second and third - The two switches which arm the earth landing sequencer
were not thrown at 30 000 feet (9]45 m). (They were thrown 55 seconds
late.)
Fourth - The reaction control system was not disabled manually.
Any one of the three independent missed functions would have prevented
the entry of toxic gases.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Reevaluations of automatlc/manual functions of future designs shall
be conducted in llght of the possibility of crew error for all critical
functions.
This anomaly is closed.
?
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TABLE I.- EFFECTS OF NITROGEN DIOXIDE ON MAN a
Concentration, Comment
ppm
0.05 USSR: Maximum allowable concent=ations - average dur-
(0.i mg/cu m) ing 24 hours
0.15 USSR: Maximum allowable concentrations - single expo-
(0.3 mg/cu m) sure
0.2 Calculated limit for space travel
0.5 Submarine maximum for 90-day dive
i to 3 Odor threshold
2.0 Maximum allowable concentration for industry (USSR) as
of 1959
5 Ceiling threshold limit value for occupation exposures
(average for 8-bout day, 5 days per week)
Exposure of one asthmatic and one pilocarplnized volun-
teer for 5 minutes, no effects noted
4
J
i0 Slxty-minute emergency exposure level for occupationml
exposure
10 Maximum permitted for 1 hour in submarine
i0 Normal volunteer exposed for 60 minutes, interpreted
as not showing impairment of pulmonary function
13 Eight volunteers: three of eight had eye irritation;
seven of eight had nasal irritation; four of eight had
pulmonary discomfort; six of eight had olfactory cog-
nition; two of eight had CNS effects; a_1 predominantly
slight
20 Workers in nitric acid recovery plants reputedly exposed
to levels averaging up to 20 ppm for up to 18 months
showed no III effects
20 Emergency exposure limit for 30-minute exposure
I
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TABLE I.- EFFECTS OF NITROGEN DIOXIDE ON MAN a- Concluded
Concentration, Co_ent
ppm
.... . i| i i 'L I
25 Emergency exposure limit for ]5-minute exposure
25 Seven human volunteers exposed for 5 minutes. Slight
or moderate nasal dlscom_ort in five of seven pulmonary
discomfort in three of seven; odor detected by six of
seven. No consistent changes in expirato_:y reserve,
vital capacity, or MBC
30-35 Workers exposed at 30 to 35 ppm to nitrous fumes over
several years; had no ill effects
35 Emergency exposure limit for 5 minutes
50 Seven human volunteers exposed for i minute; three of
seven had pulmonary discomfort and nasal irritation
64 Moderate irritation of iaryn_ and increase in respira-
tory rate in volunteers
80 In 3 to 5 minutes, volunteers got tightness of chest
100 Produced rapid, marked irritation of larynx and cough
in volunteers
300-400 Few minutes' exposure will cause broncho-pneumonia and
death
500 Few minutes' exposure will cause pulmonary edema
i ,w E. ,,,
STable taken from reference 1. On the basis of Chase kinds of data,
Cooper and Tabershaw reco_nd that "brief exposures of a 8eneral popula-
tion should not exceed 3 ppm over a period of 1 hour." This is based on
the possible potentiation of infections and on the odor thresholds.
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ELS LOGIC-ON, ELS-AUTO - 9X103(30 000 ft) (9145 m) Actual events
28 (adjdstedtime 224:54:12) enclosed by boxes
Cabin relief valve open(auto)
(24 500 ft) (7470 m) (224:54:23) 126 - 8
Forward heatshield jettison (auto)
(24 500 ft) (7470.1)
(adjusted time 224:54:23)24
Drogueparachutes deployment(auto)
(23 500 ft) (7160,11) - 7(adjusted time 224:54:25)22
_ Forward heat shield jettisoned (man)]
(i9 700 ft) (6005 m) (224:54:34)
20
Drogueparachutesdeployed (man) I - 6
(18 550 ft) (5655 m) (224:54:37) I
18 RCS isolation valves closed (man) I
(16 000 ft) (4880 m) (224:54:44) I
16 Main parachutesdeployment(auto) 5
_- (i0 500 ft)(3200 m) E
"_ (adjusted time 224:55:,.8) 3
= 14
Reaction control systemdisabled (auto) ! 4 '_
12 _ (9600 ft.) (2925 m) (224:55:07.6) I
Main parachutesdeployed (man) ]
10 - (7150 ft)(2180 m)(224:55:17)! 3
Main parachutesopen
8 - ..5070 ft) (1545 m) (224;55:32)
2
_--" Norainal trajectory
4 - _
2 - Estimatedact.al trajector_ _
o I I I I I o
: 224:54:00 54:40 55:20 56:00 56:40 57:20 58:00 58:40 59:20 225:00:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 3.- Comparisonof actualandnominaldescentsequences.
- 32
1976023153-014
L_
1976023153-015
..... _.,  ,,
..... h.......
.... T.................l .....T .............'
N ] , I I., ! z
' t t'
1 r _
Z4
1976023153-016

....-"....................... -_,, _ _ .... _,_ ,_r,4,,_
h I.............. f ...........
i
T
-,4
i
p
I I
f 'L
ORIGINALPAGEIS _,,
I
1976023153-018
-" --- . ............... - i i nili i i .... I I
" 1600 -
Reactioncontrol
systemdisabled(55:08)
700 ppm
1400 -
All concentrationsare expressed
as parts permillion nitrogen
dioxideat 1atmosphere.1200 -
Averageoxidizerconcentrationoutside
inlet to cabin pressure relief valve
was 2000 ppmor 4100 mg/m"_.1000 --
e_
E
E
o 800 -
e-
u
c
o
u Averageexposure
600 -- for 4 rain 40 sec:
250 ppmor 510 mg/m3
Suit
400 - compressor
off (57:58)
Oxygenmasks
on
200 -- Reactioncontrol
systemisolation
valves closed(54:44)
o i i t 1 I t
224:54:00 55:00 56:00 57:00 58:00 59:00 225=00:00
Elapsedtime, hr:min:se¢
Figure 8.- Oxidizerconcentrationin cabin
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90K ( , ) Watch _ 90K ( ,: ) Watch
STMpeg 0:00 _ 50K STM_gESSB/EO:_050
Stop DAC SECS PYRO (2) - ARM
DAC - T8 40K CM UNSTAL_LE-
50K CA,3PRESS B/E 0"50 I.RCSCMD - OFF•
i
!:40K APEX •SECSPYRO (2)-ARM +2s DROGUES• i
33K ELS LOGIC/AUTO 30K ELS LOGIC/AUTO
Start DAC Start DAC
24K RCS/APEX/DROGUES l:3t.,24K RCS/APEX/DROGUES 1.36
23K CAB PRESS INCR l*RCS CMD - OFF•
IeAPEX PB •
• No incr by 17K • l• +2s DROGUES
* CAB PRESS (RH) - DUMP * I . .---..J
1OK Cab 13 psi 2=22 DROGUESFAIL:
o.,csI 5K MAINS
! I " ELS AUTORET II 17K No CAB PRESS INCREASE,
.05G i)
il ,=,CABPRESS (RH) - DUMP•
BBO (II) CM RCS PRPLNT (2) - OFF
EBO il IOK _Cab_ 2:22it • MAINS •
-° " ili) RET
MNS il II) .05
BBO
" EBO
(a) ASTP
DRO
(b) Skylab third visit
Figure 10.- ASTP and Skylab landingcuecardsfor panel3.
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APPENDIX
ESTIMATE OF NITROGEN TETROXIDE CONCENTRATION INGESTED INTO COMMAND
MODULE CABIN DURING APOLLO SOYUZ MISSION
INTRODUCTION
A study was made to determine the possible concentration of oxidizer
which could have entered the command module cabin near the conclusion of
the Apollo Soyuz mission. The probable mechanism which would allow this
influx was vortex mixing in the near wake of the command module.
ANALYSIS
As the command module descends, tilewake region is bounded by the
command module conical afterbody and by a cylinder having the same diam-
eter as the co=mmnd module. Vortices exist in this wake region which
provide the mechanism for mixing of the air and oxidizer prior to the
mixture ingestion.
Two descent events were considered in the analysis: manual opera-
tion of switches to close the reaction control system isolation valves at
224 hours 54 minutes 44 seconds (7 seconds after deployment of the drogue
parachutes) and automatic disabling of the reaction control system firing
commands at 224 hours 55 minutes 7.6 seconds (approximately 30 seconds
after deployment of the drogue parachutes). The approximate command mod-
ule velocities at the times of these events were 373 ft/sec (114 m/sec)
and 253 ft/sec (77.1 m/sec), respectively, and the altitudes were 16 000
feet (4880 m) and 9600 feet (2925 m), respectively. The reaction control
system roll thruster that was emitting oxidizer for the majority of the
30-second interval was 4.5 inches (11.4 cm) downstream, 22.5 inches
(57.2 cm) cross-stream, and was angled in the direction of the steam vent
(the opening to the cabin pressure relief valve). The oxidizer flowing
" from this thruster was taken as the only source that entered the cabin.
The turbulent near wake of the com_nand module is a three-dlmenslonal
phenomenon (even though the cou--and module is essentlally axially symmet-
rical) including both downstream and cross-stream components of circula-
tion. For simplicity, the mixing may be represented as shown in figure
A-I. Between the separation streamline and the counnand module afterbody
(cone), vortices are periodically growing and shedding. As a vortex grows
to its maximum size, the efflux of the roll thruster is contained by the
A-1
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vortex, mixed, and ingested through the steam vent. The vortex is shed
and the process continues. The frequency of the shedding as well as the
volume of the mixture directly influence the concentration of the oxidizer.
The Strouhal number may be used to describe the frequency of thls
shedding and is defined as nd/V where n is the frequency, d is the diam-
eter and V is the freestream veloclty. For bluff bodies such as the com-
mand module, a Strouhal number of approximately 0.2 may be used. In or-
der to substantiate this concept, photographs from a drop test of the
co,and module were evaluated. This test occurred April 4, 1968, and
was designated "Apollo Block II Drop Test 85-i." Still photographs of
the movie documenting thls test were reviewed. Of interest to thls anal-
ysis is the flow field visualization provided by the smoke from the mortar
used to deploy the forward heat shield. The periodic nature of the vor-
tices shed is clearly evident. Furthermore, an approximation of the
Strouhal number is possible. The time markings on the right of the film
strip occur every 0.1 second, indicating a camera speed of approximately
70 frames per second. The vortices are shed at a frequency of from six
to seven per second, yielding a Strouhal number of approximately 0.2
based on a velocity of 370 ft/sec (113 m/set). The distance through which
mixing occurs appears to be as long as a command module diameter doun-
stream, although the smoke appears to be concentrated closer to the sepa-
ration point (the maximum diameter, d).
The volume of the vortex which was considered in this study was de-
termimed as bounded by a cylinder of diameter d, a cone frustum of 33 de- t
srees (0.576 radian) half-angle with the forward heat shield removed, and
a peripheral angle of 30 degrees (0.524 radian) eaci, qide of the cabin
relief vent. This volume includes the reaction control system roll
thruster and steam vent but excludes the yaw and pitch thrusters. The
mixing length was chosen as 65 inches (165 cm), yielding from figure A-2
a volume of 50 cubic feet (1.42 m3).
From previous data, it is seen that the roll thruster oxidizer valve
was open most of ths time; for this analysis, the thruster yes co_.sidered
to have emitted oxidizer continuously. As a rssult, the concentration of
the mixture that could have entsrsd the cabin is only a function of the
mixing volume and the comuand module velocity. Detailed calculstions of
the two cues considered follov.
A-2
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Case I.-
V = 373 ft/sec (114 m/sec)
d = 154 in. (3.91 m)
h - 16 000 ft (4880 m)
nd
Strouhal number - 0.2 =--
V
0.2 V 0.2 (373) 5.813 per second
n = T= 154/12 "
M - 0.0272 kg/sec x (set) . 0.00468 ks5.813
Volume of mixture _ 50 fr3 (1.416 m3)
M
-- - oxidizer concentration
V
= 0.00468_ xiO6_
V 1.416 m_ kg
= 3307 mg/m 3
I v
Conversion Co p_rts per million:
Nitrogen dioxide: 14.008 g/gram mole
32.000
46.008 g/gram mole
46.008 glzrem mole x _ 2.053 x 106 m81_ 3
22.414 liters/gram mole x 10-0 m_/ltter =
- 3307/2.053 x 106 = 1611 ppm nitrogen dioxide at 1 atmosphere
(standard temperature and pressure)
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Came II.-
V = 253 ft/sec (77.1 m/sec)
d - 154 in. (3.91 m)
h = 9500 £t (2900 m)
nd
Strouhal number = 0.2 - --V
0.2 V 0.2 (253)
n = T = 154/12 = 3.943 per secm,d
M- 0.0272 kg/sec x (sec)= 0.00690 ks3.943
M 0.00690 k4L
= 1.416 m3 x ks
= 4876 m$/m3V
Conversion to parts per million:
= 2375 ppm nitropn dioxide 8t 1 etmosphsre
(standard temperature and pressure)
Averalte of cases I and II.-
3307 nli/m 3
4876
8-T_'q/n 3 8183/2 = 4091 mB/m3
4091 miilm3 _ 4100miilm3
4100/2.053 x 106 = 1993 _ 2000 ppm nitroetm dioxide at
1 aUmsphere (standard temperature
and pressure)
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RESULTS
Table I-A lists velocity, altitude, and oxidizer concentration in
the wake of the spacecraft versus time for 24 seconds starting at 16 000
feet (4880 m) altitude.
At the beginning of the ozldizer influx, the calculations yield a
concentration of 3307 mg/m 3 of oxidizer; at the end of the influx, the
concentration was calculated to be 4868 mg/m 3. These results were based
on an assumed maximum vortex volume of 50 cubic feet (1.42 m3). Since
the concentration is essentially inversely proportional to the volume of
the vortex, these results are a direct function of this assumption.
The resulting probable concentration average value was found to be
about 4100 mg/m 3 of oxidizer or 2000 parts of nitrogen dioxide per mil-
lion parts of air at i atmosphere.
A-5
i
1976023153-028
T !!
q
TABLE I-A.- OXIDIZER CONCENTRATION IN SPACECRAFT WAKE
Time, Velocity Altitude Oxidizer,
sec ft/sec m/sec feet meters mg/m3
...... i
0 373 114 16 000 4880 3307
i 355 108 15 675 4780 3475
2 339 103 15 375 4685 3639
3 323 98 15 075 4595 3819
4 313 95 14 750 4495 3941
5 303 92 14 425 4395 407?
6 296 90 14 i00 4295 416 1
7 290 88 13 825 4210 4253
8 286 87 13 550 4130 4313
9 282 86 13 300 4050 4374
i0 278 85 13 025 3970 4437
ii 274 84 12 750 3885 4501
12 272 83 12 500 3810 4535
13 269 82 12 250 3730 4586
14 267 81 12 000 3655 4620
15 265 81 ii 750 3580 4655
16 263 80 Ii 500 3505 4690
17 262 80 11 250 3430 4708
18 260 79 11 000 3350 4744
19 259 79 10 725 3270 4763
20 257 78 i0 475 3190 4800
21 256 78 i0 225 3115 4818
22 255 77 i0 000 3050 4837
23 254 77 9 750 2970 4856
23.6 253.4 77 9 600 2925 4868
24 253 77 9 500 2900 4876
A-6
J
1976023153-029
I II II
-4
lr
A-?
1976023153-030
.=,==,====Ji ........................
I
_w 'awnlo x^a:l.=OA
,,O u3 _1" o'_ c,a _ O
,,O
'1 I I I I !
0
0 - '_"
0
o f
E IN '- x
0 t-- _
" E
e- ..I _
_.1 0 0 0
_ X
0
!
o o M
0 __ _" n
°_
0 U.
m
I I I I I o
0 0 0 0 0 0 o
_lJ 'atUnlOAxa:l.=°A
A-8
1976023153-031
